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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and
Gregory R. Miller**
Of the domestic relations cases decided by the Georgia Supreme Court
and the Georgia Court of Appeals during the survey period,1 twentyseven are digested here. Possibly the most notable events of the survey
period were pieces of legislation that were not enacted. A bill to restore
direct appeals for certain domestic relations cases did not make it to the
Governor's desk, and the Governor vetoed a bill that would have
required trial judges hearing custody cases to consider the custodial
elections of children between the ages of twelve and fourteen.2 While
the Georgia General Assembly otherwise focused on ways to aid in
enforcing child support judgments, the appellate courts addressed a
variety of issues.

I. DIVORCE PROCEDURE
The supreme court reviewed two cases in which one spouse sought to
set aside the divorce decree obtained by the other. In Wright v. Wright,3
the supreme court held that the husband's motion to set aside the
parties' divorce decree should have been granted.4 When the husband's
attorney withdrew his representation, the order stated that further
notices should be sent to the husband. When the trial court scheduled

* Partner in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Turner, Turner & Turner, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D., 1994). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. This Article chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 1998 to May 31, 1999.
2. H.R. 534, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999); H.R. 407, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999).
3. 270 Ga. 229, 509 S.E.2d 902 (1998).
4. Id. at 229-30, 509 S.E.2d at 902-03.
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the final trial, the court did not mail the husband notice because of a
clerical error. Two days before trial, the wife's counsel issued the
husband a subpoena for the production of documents. Believing the wife
provided inadequate notice, the husband did not respond to the
subpoena. The trial court struck the husband's answer and demand for
jury trial and entered a decree of divorce. Subsequently, the trial court
denied the husband's motion to set aside the judgment.5 On discretionary appeal, the supreme court reversed, finding that the wife provided
insufficient notice of the trial.6 The subpoena may have put the
husband on notice that something was scheduled in the case; however,
the husband was entitled to notice of the specific nature of the scheduled
hearing.7
In Pierce v. Pierce,' the supreme court again held that procedural
errors warranted setting aside the parties' divorce decree. 9 The
husband obtained permission to serve the wife by publication, stating
the wife's last known address was "General Delivery, Kansas." After
obtaining the divorce, the husband mailed the decree to the former
marital home in Missouri, and the postal service forwarded the decree
to the wife's new address in Missouri. The wife moved to set aside the
decree, alleging that the husband's petition contained material misrepresentations and that the husband knew the wife's phone number as well
as the addresses and phone numbers of her lawyer and parents in
Kansas. 0 The supreme court held that a party must use due diligence
to discover the opposing party's address and still be unable to locate that
party before service by publication is warranted." The issues raised
by the wife's motion to set aside the divorce decree demonstrated the
husband's lack of due diligence. 2
In Shah v. Shah, 3 the supreme court held that a party may not add
independent tort claims against a third-party defendant in a divorce
case.' 4 The wife added her father-in-law as a third-party defendant
based on her allegations that the husband was fraudulently conveying
marital assets to his father. Alleging fraud, the wife then added tort

5. Id.
6. Id. at 231, 509 S.E.2d at 904.
7. Id.
8. 270 Ga. 416, 511 S.E.2d 157 (1999).
9. Id. at 417-18, 511 S.E.2d at 157-58.
10. Id. at 416-17, 511 S.E.2d at 157.
11. Id. at 418, 511 S.E.2d at 158 (citing Abba Gana v. Abba Gana, 251 Ga. 340, 343,
304 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1983)).
12. Id.
13. 270 Ga. 649, 513 S.E.2d 730 (1999).
14. Id. at 651, 513 S.E.2d at 732.
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claims against her father-in-law. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the wife.' 5 While Georgia law expressly allows one spouse in a divorce
case to join claims against the other spouse, the code is silent as to the
joinder of claims against a third-party defendant, except when a
fradulent conveyance claim is present. 16 Absent statutory authorization, the supreme court held that the jury in the divorce case was not
entitled to consider the tort claims against the father-in-law. 7
II. CHILD SUPPORT
In Gruben v. Gittelman,5 the supreme court held that a trial court
correctly refused to grant a motion to set aside a divorce decree based
solely on an order of child support that was inconsistent with the Child
Support Guidelines. 9 A jury verdict obligated the father to pay $1250
per month as support for the parties' one child.2" Although the
Guidelines suggest that child support should be in the range of
seventeen to twenty-three percent of the father's gross income,2 the
jury verdict required that the father pay only eight percent of his gross
income.22 The verdict found no special circumstances to justify
deviating from the Guidelines. Seventeen months later, the wife filed a
motion to set aside the divorce decree. 2' The court found that the wife
failed to exercise due diligence by failing to object to the verdict when it
was rendered. 24 Absent due diligence or a showing that the interests
of the child were adversely affected by the amount of child support
awarded, she was not entitled to have her motion granted.2 5
In Bradley v. Bradley,2 6 the supreme court held that a trial court
lacked the authority to award the child dependency exemption to the
noncustodial parent.2" When the parties were unable to reach agreement on all the issues in their divorce case, they agreed to submit the

15. Id. at 649-50, 513 S.E.2d at 731.
16. Id. at 650-51, 513 S.E.2d at 731 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-18 (1993)).
17. Id. at 651, 513 S.E.2d at 731-32.
18. 269 Ga. 686, 502 S.E.2d 220 (1998).
19. Id. at 686, 502 S.E.2d at 221. The Child Support Guidelines are codified at
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (1999).
20. 269 Ga. at 687, 502 S.E.2d at 221.
21. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b)(5) (1999).
22. 269 Ga. at 686, 502 S.E.2d at 220.
23. Id., 502 S.E.2d at 220-21.
24. Id. at 687, 502 S.E.2d at 221-22.
25. Id. at 687-88, 502 S.E.2d at 221-22 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d); Marshall v.
Marshall, 257 Ga. 494, 495, 360 S.E.2d 572, 573-74 (1987)).
26. 270 Ga. 488, 512 S.E.2d 248 (1999) (4-3 decision).
27. Id. at 489, 512 S.E.2d at 250.
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remaining issues to the trial court. The trial court awarded the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent and ordered a
reduction in child support if the other parent successfully appealed the
issue."8 Relying on the rationale in Blanchard v. Blanchard,9 the
supreme court held that the trial court lacked the authority to award the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent3 ° A contrary result
would (1) provide the state with a taxation power reserved to the federal
government, (2) prevent uniformity as contemplated by the federal
statute, and (3) burden Georgia courts with case-by-case determinations.31 The court further held that the automatic reduction of child
support was invalid because the reduction set child support outside the
Child Support Guidelines without enumerating any special circumstances warranting the departure.3 2 The dissent found no merit in the
majority's rationale and noted that most states have ruled in favor of
allowing their courts to determine which parent receives the dependency
exemption."
In Koch v. Martin, 4 the supreme court reversed the trial court's
ruling that the father was entitled to offset dependent social security
disability payments against his child support obligation. 5 Prior to the
divorce, the father began receiving social security disability payments,
and the parties' child began receiving dependent social security disability
payments.36 While previous Georgia cases allowed offsets of disability
payments against child support obligations, none of them involved
disability payments that began prior to the divorce. 7
Because the
basis of the parties' child support award was the father's receipt of
disability benefits and not the child's dependency benefits, the trial court
erred in allowing the offset.38
In Mooney v. Mooney, 9 the court of appeals held that a party could
sustain an action for child support based on promissory estoppel.4 ° The
wife alleged that she agreed to become the guardian of her grandchild

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 488, 512 S.E.2d at 249.
261 Ga. 11, 401 S.E.2d 714 (1991).
270 Ga. at 488-89, 512 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 488, 512 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 489, 512 S.E.2d at 249-50.
Id. at 489-90, 512 S.E.2d at 250 (Fletcher, P.J., dissenting).
270 Ga. 419, 510 S.E.2d 520 (1999).
Id. at 419, 510 S.E.2d at 520.

36. Id.
37.
S.E.2d
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 419-20, 510 S.E.2d at 521 (citing Perteet v. Sumner, 246 Ga. 182, 182, 269
453, 454 (1980); Horton v. Horton, 219 Ga. 177, 178, 132 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1963)).
Id. at 420, 510 S.E.2d at 521.
235 Ga. App. 117, 508 S.E.2d 766 (1998).
Id. at 120, 508 S.E.2d at 769.
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in exchange for her husband's promise to contribute to the support of the
child. When the parties divorced, no provision was made for child
support. The wife then filed an action seeking support based on the
custody award. The trial court dismissed the action, holding that the
husband could not be compelled, absent an agreement, to support his
grandchild.41 The appellate court reversed, finding that the mother
presented sufficient evidence to allow her case to proceed on the theory
of promissory estoppel.42 According to the court, an obligation to pay
43
child support can arise from "'parentage or contract.'"

III. MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT
In Wingard v. Paris," the supreme court was asked to interpret the
modification statute.4 5 The supreme court held that the custodial
parent need only show that either the noncustodial parent's income or
the child's needs have increased to obtain a modification of child
support. 46 The trial court found that the father's income had substantially increased but then erroneously denied the request for modification
because the mother had not proven an increase in the child's needs.47
The supreme court found that because modifications are permitted upon
a showing of a "'change in the income and financial status of either
former spouse or in the needs of the child,"' the trial court misapplied
the statute by requiring the mother to show both a change in the father's
income and the needs of the child.48
The court of appeals also decided issues concerning the Full Faith &
Credit for Child Support Orders Act ("FFCCSOA). 49 In Connell v.
Woodward,5 ° the court of appeals held that Georgia courts cannot
modify Florida child support orders when one party continues to reside
in Florida.51 While the father was in Georgia visiting the parties' child,
the mother had the father served with a petition to domesticate the
Florida child support judgment, a petition to modify child support, and
a motion for contempt. When the father did not appear for the hearing,

41.
42.
43.
S.E.2d
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 117-18, 508 S.E.2d at 767-68.
Id. at 120, 508 S.E.2d at 769.
Id. at 119, 508 S.E.2d at 768 (quoting Wright v. Newman, 266 Ga. 519, 519, 467
533, 534 (1996)).
270 Ga. 439, 511 S.E.2d 167 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19 (1999).
270 Ga. at 439, 511 S.E.2d at 168.
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(a) (1999)) (emphasis added by court).
28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
235 Ga. App. 751, 509 S.E.2d 647 (1998).
Id. at 754, 509 S.E.2d at 649-50.
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the mother received the relief she requested. The father then filed a
motion to set aside, which the trial court denied.52 The appellate court
agreed with the father that Florida retained continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under the FFCCSOA.5 3
A state retains continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction if the state remains the residence of the child or
either parent.54 Even though the father was served in Georgia, his
permanent residence in Florida prevented Georgia from exercising
jurisdiction over the child support issues.55 The fact that the parties'
child support order was entered prior to the enactment of the FFCCSOA
was of no consequence.5" The FFCCSOA applies to all child support
modification actions initiated after its effective date, regardless of the
57
date of the underlying order.
In Department of Human Resources v. Fenner,58 the court of appeals
held that the trial court improperly granted the father temporary relief
from a child support judgment based on the father's allegation of
fraud.59 The mother obtained a child support order in Connecticut.
When she tried to obtain enforcement in Georgia through the Department of Human Resources, the father questioned paternity and alleged
fraud on the mother's part.60 While the appellate court held that fraud
is a valid defense to an action under FFCCSOA, the facts of the father's
case prevented him from sustaining his burden of proof.6 ' The issue of
paternity was raised before entry of the Connecticut order. 2 The
father's failure to investigate at the time of the divorce was the result of
the father's negligence, not any misrepresentation by the mother.6 A
party seeking to set aside a judgment based on fraud cannot be
contributorily negligent as the father was in this case.64

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 752, 509 S.E.2d at 648.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 754, 509 S.E.2d at 649-50.
Id., 509 S.E.2d at 650.
Id.
235 Ga. App. 233, 510 S.E.2d 534 (1998).
Id. at 233, 510 S.E.2d at 535.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 235, 510 S.E.2d at 536.
Id., 510 S.E.2d at 536-37.
Id. at 234-35, 510 S.E.2d at 536 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) (1993)).
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MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY

The supreme court addressed two cases in which it found interlocutory
5
modifications of alimony to be inappropriate. In Cannon v. Cannon,"
the supreme court reversed the trial court's grant of a temporary
modification of alimony.6 Despite the fact that the parties' divorce
settlement included a waiver of the right to modify alimony by both
parties, the ex-husband filed an action to decrease alimony based on a
change in his financial condition. The trial court granted interlocutory
relief. While the appeal was pending, the ex-wife died. 7 Because there
was still an issue of the amount of alimony due to her estate, her appeal
was not rendered moot by her death. 8 When the right to modify
spousal support has been waived in unambiguous terms, as in this case,
the waiver is enforceable.69
In Wilson v. Wilson,7" the supreme court again reversed a trial court's
grant of a temporary modification of alimony.7 When the ex-husband
filed an action to modify alimony, the ex-wife filed a counter-complaint
for contempt. The trial court granted the ex-husband temporary relief.
After he was found to be in contempt, however, he voluntarily dismissed
his modification action. Eight months later, he filed another action to
modify alimony. The ex-wife argued that section 19-6-19 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") barred the ex-husband from
filing a second modification action within two years of the first. The
trial court held that the voluntary dismissal was not a "final order;"
therefore, the two-year bar was not triggered.72 The supreme court
reversed the trial court.7" Because the first action resulted in significant litigation, including a temporary modification of support, the court
reasoned that O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19 applied and that the exhusband's case should have been dismissed. 4

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

270 Ga. 640, 514 S.E.2d 204 (1999).
Id. at 641, 514 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 640-41, 514 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 641, 514 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. (citing Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309, 311, 248 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1978)).
270 Ga. 479, 512 S.E.2d 255 (1999).
Id. at 479, 512 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.
Id. at 481, 512 S.E.2d at 258.
Id., 512 S.E.2d at 257-58.
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V. MODIFICATION OF CHILD CUSTODY
When the court of appeals reviewed custody modification cases
relating to Georgia decrees during the survey period, the court was
determining primarily whether the facts justified the trial courts'
rulings. In Daniel v. Daniel,7" the court of appeals affirmed the change
of custody to the father.7" The mother challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence that justified modification. Since the parties' divorce in 1992,
their child had been diagnosed with asthma. Despite the diagnosis, the
mother and her live-in boyfriend continued to smoke in the child's
presence. The child required several visits to a doctor for respiratory
problems while in the mother's care." Based on these facts, the trial
court was authorized to change custody because of a change in circumstances since the divorce decree.78
In Tenney v. Tenney," the court of appeals held that a trial court
cannot modify a custody order without a showing of a change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.8 ° The original custody
award vested primary physical custody with the father. When the father
contemplated a move to Florida, the mother petitioned for custody. The
father's job offer in Florida was retracted and the father decided not to
move. The trial court modified the custody order to provide that custody
would be transferred to the mother if the father moved to Florida. The
trial court then held that if the father wanted to move and retain
custody, he could provide the mother with the names of five psychologists from which the mother could select one to evaluate the effects that
a move would have on their child and to report to the trial court for a
final custody determination."
Reversing the trial court, the court of
appeals held that a move to Florida and the child's fears concerning the
move were insufficient reasons to modify custody.82 Furthermore, the
trial court's provision for a psychological evaluation was improper.83
The entry of a final order ends the case, and the trial court cannot retain
84
jurisdiction to open the case without either party filing a new action.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

235 Ga. App. 184, 509 S.E.2d 117 (1998).
Id. at 184, 509 S.E.2d at 119.
Id. at 184-85, 509 S.E.2d at 119.
Id. at 184-86, 509 S.E.2d at 119-20.
235 Ga. App. 128, 508 S.E.2d 487 (1998).
Id. at 129, 508 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. at 128-29, 508 S.E.2d at 488.
Id. at 130, 508 S.E.2d at 489.
Id.
Id., 508 S.E.2d at 489-90.
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In Mock v. Smith,85 the court of appeals held that Georgia courts
have jurisdiction to modify child custody orders even when the custodial
parent is a nonresident.8 6 The mother was in the process of moving
from Arizona to California. During the transition, the mother came to
Georgia to visit her mother. The father had the mother served in
Georgia with a complaint to change custody. The father, a Georgia
resident, was exercising extended visitation with the parties' children. 7
The trial court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction, but the court of appeals
reversed." Georgia courts may exercise jurisdiction over child custody
issues when one party is a Georgia resident and substantial evidence
exists in the state concerning the children's care.89 Because the mother
had no plans to return to Arizona, little relevant evidence would be
found there."° Furthermore, because the children had not yet even
visited California, the evidence in California would have been minimal.9 However, the children spent each summer in Georgia and had
relatives from each parent's family there.92 Hence, jurisdiction in
Georgia was proper.9 3
When the courts considered modification cases involving foreign
custody awards, the rulings were more procedural in nature. The court
of appeals vacated two modification orders because the plaintiffs
attempted to modify foreign judgments without having the foreign
decrees properly domesticated; thus, the trial courts lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to modify custody.94
VI.

CUSTODY: THIRD PARTIES

Georgia's appellate courts decided several cases involving the rights
of third parties and children. In In re A.PH.,9 the court of appeals

85. 233 Ga. App. 36, 503 S.E.2d 319 (1998).
86. Id. at 36, 503 S.E.2d at 319.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 38, 503 S.E.2d at 321.
90. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 320.
91. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 320-21.
92. Id., 503 S.E.2d at 321.
93. Id.
94. Wylie v. Blatchley, 237 Ga. App. 563, 564, 515 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1999); Kempton v.
Richards, 233 Ga. App. 238, 238, 503 S.E.2d 876, 876-77 (1998). Each plaintiff filed a copy
of the foreign decree as an exhibit to the modification action; however, neither plaintiff
requested that the foreign decree be domesticated. 237 Ga. App. at 564, 515 S.E.2d at 856;
233 Ga. App. at 238, 503 S.E.2d at 876-77.
95. 236 Ga. App. 762, 514 S.E.2d 46 (1999).

272

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

reversed an award of custody to the child's former stepfather.96 During
the parties' marriage, the wife's son from a previous relationship
developed a strong bond with his stepfather. After the divorce, the
fifteen-year-old boy decided he preferred to reside with his former
stepfather. The stepfather filed a deprivation action to seek custody.
The only evidence of deprivation was the child's claim that his mother
sometimes was out late on dates. After the trial court granted custody
to the stepfather, the mother appealed.97 The appellate court reversed
the trial court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a
clear and convincing case that the child was deprived.9" The uncontroverted evidence showed that an adult supervised the child when his
mother was on dates.99 Because the child was not denied food, clothing, or shelter, the evidence did not support a finding of deprivation. 100
The trial court was not entitled to use the "best interests of the child"
standard to award custody to a third party.'0 ' The decision of the
fifteen-year-old child did not govern the case because a stepfather is not
a parent within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 19-9-3.102
A former stepfather fared much better in In re J.S.G.,' °3 in which
the court of appeals allowed him to become the adoptive father of his
stepson.' 04 The trial court previously denied the adoption petition for
two reasons. First, the former stepfather's divorce from the child's
mother meant he was no longer a stepfather within the meaning of the
statute authorizing stepparent adoptions. Second, the adoption statute
requires that a married person seeking to adopt a child must file jointly
with the spouse. The stepfather had remarried since his divorce from
the child's mother. The trial court found that the new wife was not
entitled to adopt because the child had a natural mother.0 5 The court
of appeals held the trial court's construction of the statute was too
narrow. 10 6 Georgia law has not defined the term "stepparent" to have
any time restrictions.0 7
Citing the unusual circumstances, the

96. Id. at 763-64, 514 S.E.2d at 47-48.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 762-63, 514 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 763, 514 S.E.2d at 47-48.
Id. at 762, 514 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 763, 514 S.E.2d at 48.

101. Id. (citing In re R.L.L. & J.M.L., 258 Ga. 628, 628, 373 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1998);
Carvalho v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 94, 94, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1981); In re J.C.P., 167 Ga. App.
572, 573, 307 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983)).

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
233 Ga. App. 690, 505 S.E.2d 70 (1998).
Id. at 690, 505 S.E.2d at 70.
Id. at 690-91, 505 S.E.2d at 70-71.
Id. at 691-92, 505 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 691, 505 S.E.2d at 71.
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the child's best interests
appellate court decided that the adoption was in
10 8
and that substance should prevail over form.
The constitutionality of Georgia's grandparent visitation statute is yet
to be decided by the appellate courts. The original grandparent
visitation statute was held unconstitutional in 1995.109 The legislature
revised the statute in 1996,11' and although challenges to the new
statute have been made at the trial court level, the appellate courts have
In Rogers v.
not yet addressed the constitutionality on appeal.
grant of
court's
the
trial
affirmed
of
appeals
the
court
Barnett,"'
the
mother's
over
visitation rights to the maternal grandmother
objections." 2 The mother's appeal contained only parts of the transcript; therefore, the court of appeals could not consider the sufficiency
of the evidence."' The court of appeals refused to transfer the mother's constitutional challenges to the statute to the supreme court
because she did not properly raise them at the trial court level." 4
VII.

CONTEMPT

In contempt cases, the appellate courts were frequently faced with
determining whether the defendant's justification was satisfactory to
show that the contempt was not willful. In Turman v. Boleman,"' the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to hold the father in
contempt; however, the appellate court held that part of the parties'
During the parties'
settlement agreement was unenforceable." 6
divorce case, they agreed that the wife would not exercise visitation in
the presence of any African-American male. The agreement was made
a judgment of the court. When the mother married an AfricanAmerican, the father refused to allow the mother to exercise visitation
outside his home, and the mother filed a contempt action. The trial
court found that the visitation restriction was enforceable as an
agreement between the parties and, therefore, that the father was not
in violation of the parties' divorce decree." 7 The court of appeals held
that, while the father's reliance on the language of the decree prevented

108. Id. at 692, 505 S.E.2d at 71.
109.

See Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, 193-94, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (1995).

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (1999).
237 Ga. App. 301, 514 S.E.2d 443 (1999).
Id. at 301, 514 S.E.2d at 444.
Id., 514 S.E.2d at 444-45.
Id. at 302-03, 514 S.E.2d at 445.

115. 235 Ga. App. 243, 510 S.E.2d 532 (1998).
116. Id. at 243, 510 S.E.2d at 533.
117. Id. at 244, 510 S.E.2d at 534.
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him from being in willful contempt, the language was unenforceable as
against public policy and could not be relied upon in the future. 1 8
In Brown v. Brown,"' the supreme court held that the 1997 amendment to the dormancy statute, which exempted spousal and child
support judgments from the definition of dormant judgments, was not
retroactive in its application. 120 Prior to the amendment's passage, the
former wife filed a contempt action for nonpayment of alimony dating
back as far as ten years and for any portion of the alimony that was
dormant. The former husband argued that he was not in contempt
because the payments in question were for a time period when the wife
was involved in a meretricious relationship. The trial court agreed with
the former husband, and the former wife appealed.' 2 ' The supreme
court held that the parties' divorce decree did not provide for an
automatic termination of alimony upon the recipient's engaging in a
meretricious relationship. 22 Absent such a provision, the former
husband was not entitled to cease making the payments without an
order from the trial court.12 Any evidence of a "meretricious relationship would not be relevant to excuse retroactively [the husband's] failure
to pay."24 The supreme court then noted that the legislature provided
no indication that the revised dormancy statute was to be applied
retroactively.'25 Absent any signs that the legislature intended the
statute to be applied retroactively, the supreme court held the statute to
be inapplicable to judgments entered before July 1, 1997.121 The
former wife was entitled to seek only the arrearage that accrued within
ten years of the filing of her contempt action.2 7
In Kirkendall v. Decker, 28 the supreme court upheld the trial court's
finding that the ex-husband was in willful violation of the life insurance
provisions of the parties' divorce decree. 129 The decree required the exhusband to maintain life insurance, and the trial court held that the
provision was not satisfied by an accidental death policy. Although the
divorce decree stated that the ex-husband already had life insurance
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120.
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269 Ga. 724, 506 S.E.2d 108 (1998).
Id. at 726-27, 506 S.E.2d at 110 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60(d) (Supp. 1999)).
Id. at 725, 506 S.E.2d at 109.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 726-27, 506 S.E.2d at 110.
Id. at 727, 506 S.E.2d at 110.
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271 Ga. 189, 516 S.E.2d 73 (1999).
Id. at 189, 516 S.E.2d at 74.
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coverage and required him to maintain that coverage, the existing policy,
in reality, was an accidental death policy, not a whole-life or term-life
insurance policy. 130 The purpose of the life insurance provision was to
secure the award of alimony.13 ' This purpose might not have been
served under an accidental death policy. 32 Finding that an accidental
death policy is not the same as life insurance and that life insurance was
expressly required by the decree,
the trial court was authorized to find
33
contempt.
in
ex-husband
the
3
In Ford v. Ford,1
1 the supreme court reversed the contempt order
entered against the father. 5 In a previous contempt action, the
father was found to be in arrears regarding medical expenses for the
parties' children. The trial court ordered the father to pay a certain sum
immediately. In a letter to the judge, the mother requested a telephonic
hearing and that the father be held in contempt. The trial judge sent
counsel for both parties a letter stating that he received the letter from
the mother's counsel and that he was setting a date for the telephonic
hearing. The judge did not refer to the substance of the letter. Even
though the father paid the arrearage prior to the hearing, the trial court
found the father to be in criminal contempt. 36 The supreme court
held that the trial court's letter failed to give the father adequate notice
of the charge on which he was expected to defend himself.13 7 Furthermore, the father's participation in the telephonic conference did not
3
waive his right to object to a violation of his due process rights. 1

VIII.

CONTEMPT: PROCEDURE

The appellate courts were also faced with procedural issues arising out
of contempt cases. In Schmidt v. Schmidt,'3 9 the supreme court ruled
that appeals from orders under the Family Violence Act, 4 ° including
contempt of family violence orders, "must come by discretionary
application and that jurisdiciton lies in the Court of Appeals of
Georgia."'
Because the Family Violence Act is codified in Title 19
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137.

Id.

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 316, 509 S.E.2d at 614-15.
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and because Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.1142 lists actions under
the Family Violence Act as being within the scope of domestic relations,
the supreme court held that a discretionary appeal is required.4 . As
a matter of public policy, the supreme court noted that discretionary
appeals provide the ability for expedited review, which is appropriate in
cases under the Family Violence Act.'" Because the supreme court
only has appellate jurisdiction over cases involving divorce and alimony,
neither of which are issues under the Family Violence Act, the court of
appeals would always have jurisdiction over an appeal under the
5
Act. 14
In Corbett v. Corbett,'" the court of appeals held that when a
plaintiff files a petition for modification in a county other than the one
issuing the divorce decree, venue rules do not prevent filing a motion for
contempt with a complaint to change custody. 47 The parties divorced
in Macon County. The father later filed an action to change custody in
Terrell County, which was where the mother resided. He also sought to
have the mother held in contempt for violations of the visitation
provisions. The trial court declined to change custody but found the
mother to be in contempt.' 4 Although venue for a contempt action
generally lies in the county where the decree was entered, there are
exceptions. 49 The supreme court has permitted contempt actions to
be filed as counter-complaints to modification actions. 50 Using this
rationale-that flexibility is required by the unique nature of divorce
cases-the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.'
In Lewis v. Lewis,1 2 . the supreme court reversed the trial court's
order requiring child support payments to be withheld from the mother
until she complied with the divorce decree.5 3 The mother, a resident
of Mississippi, objected to personal jurisdiction after being served in
Mississippi with the father's contempt action. Although the trial court

142. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 24.1.
143. 270 Ga. at 461-62, 510 S.E.2d at 811.
144. Id. at 462, 510 S.E.2d at 811.
145. Id., 510 S.E.2d at 812 (citing GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 3; GA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 6, para. 3(b)).
146. 236 Ga. App. 299, 511 S.E.2d 633 (1999).
147. Id. at 301-02, 511 S.E.2d at 635.
148. Id. at 299-300, 511 S.E.2d at 633-34.
149. Id. at 300, 511 S.E.2d at 634 (citing Gignilliat v. Gentry, 217 Ga. App. 518,519-20,
457 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1995)).
150. Id. (citing Buckholts v. Buckholts, 251 Ga. 58, 302 S.E.2d 676 (1983)).
151. Id. at 301-02, 511 S.E.2d at 634-35 (citingBuckholts, 251 Ga. at 59-60, 302 S.E.2d
at 678).
152. 270 Ga. 409, 509 S.E.2d 926 (1999).
153. Id. at 409, 509 S.E.2d at 927.
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granted the mother's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the court ordered the father to begin making support payments to the
Child Support Receiver, instead of to the mother, until she complied with
the divorce decree.'
The supreme court reversed, holding that once
the trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction, the trial
court was without authority to make any substantive rulings' in the
case. 5 The supreme court further held that the trial court's order
making
the receipt of child support contingent on allowing visitation was
156
error.

IX.

LEGISLATION

Recent legislation continued to center on the enforcement of child
support orders. Contempt cases seeking to enforce alimony or child
support orders are now filed as part of the underlying case and do not
require a new filing fee. 57 Registrations for salespersons or investment advisor representatives can now be withheld for failure to comply
with a child support order. 158 Finally, in compliance with federal
mandates, the general assembly enacted legislation establishing and
funding a child support registry to receive certain support payments,
including those ordered to be paid through income deduction orders.'
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